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Abstract
Online social networks are the perfect test bed to better understand large-scale human behavior in
interacting contexts. Although they are broadly used and studied, little is known about how their terms of
service and posting rules affect the way users interact and information spreads. Acknowledging the relation
between network connectivity and functionality, we compare the robustness of two different online social
platforms, Twitter and Gab, with respect to dismantling strategies based on the recursive censor of users
characterized by social prominence (degree) or intensity of inflammatory content (sentiment). We find that
the moderated (Twitter) vs un-moderated (Gab) character of the network is not a discriminating factor
for intervention effectiveness. We find, however, that more complex strategies based upon the combination
of topological and content features may be effective for network dismantling. Our results provide useful
indications to design better strategies for countervailing the production and dissemination of anti-social
content in online social platforms.
1 Introduction
Online social networks provide a rich laboratory for the analysis of large-scale social interaction and of their
social effects [1, 2, 3, 4]. They facilitate the inclusive engagement of new actors by removing most barriers to
participate in content-sharing platforms characteristic of the pre-digital era [5]. For this reason, they can be
regarded as a social arena for public debate and opinion formation, with potentially positive effects on individual
and collective empowerment [6]. However, some of the structural and functional features of these networks make
them extremely sensitive to manipulation [7, 8, 9], and therefore to anti-social or plainly dysfunctional influencing
aimed at fueling hate toward social groups and minorities [10], to incite violence and discrimination [11], and
even to promote criminal conduct and behaviors [12]. As such platforms have been functioning for a very short
time on a historical scale, our experience with them is still limited, and consequently our awareness of their
critical aspects is fragmented [13]. As a consequence, the governance of such platforms is carried out on a trial-
and-error basis, with problematic implications at many levels, from the individual to the institutional [14, 15].
The most fundamental issue is the lack of widely agreed governance principles that may reliably address the
most urgent social challenges [16], and this is a consequence of the fact that we are still at the beginning of
the learning curve. On the one hand, we are becoming increasingly aware that certain features of human social
cognition that were culturally selected in a pre-digital era may call for substantial and quick adaptations to
tackle the challenges of massive online social interaction [17, 18]. On the other hand, the massive potential
public exposure that characterizes such interactions may reinforce typical human biases that lead to people’s
self-embedding in socially supportive environments [19], with the formation of echo chambers built on the
assortative matching to, and reciprocal support from, like-minded people [20, 21]. Moreover, the presence of
strong incentives to the acquisition of visibility and social credibility via the building of large pools of followers,
and the strong competition for limited attention tend to favor the production and selective circulation of content
designed to elicit strong emotional arousal in audiences [22], rather than to correctly report information and
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reliably represent facts and situations [23], with the well-known proliferation of fake news and more generally of
intentionally manipulative content [24, 25]. A further critical element is the possibility to disseminate across such
platforms purposefully designed artificial agents whose goal is that of generating and amplifying inflammatory
content that serves broader strategies of audience manipulation [26], conceived and undertaken at higher levels
of social agency by large sophisticated players that may reflect the agendas of interest groups, organizations,
and governments [27].
On the basis of such premises, it becomes very important to understand the relationship between the
structural features of such networks and their social effects, for instance in terms of manipulation vs. effective
control of the production and dissemination of anti-social and inflammatory content. In this perspective, two
main approaches have developed: one that relies upon extensive regulation of user-generated content [28], and
one that basically leaves this task to the community itself, entrusting the moderation of content production
and dissemination to the users [29]. A meaningful question that arises in this regard is: which approach is
more desirable as it comes to countering anti-social group dynamics? If socially dysfunctional content is being
generated and spread across a certain online social platform, in which case can this be handled more effectively
through a targeted removal from the network of problematic users? And how does this change when the network
is moderated, and when it is not? Quite surprisingly, at the moment the existing literature does not provide us
with an answer to these fundamental question, and this powerfully illustrates how fragmented and precarious
our understanding of such phenomena still is.
Online social networks often represent typical examples of complex social systems [30], and therefore lend
themselves to be studied and analyzed through the conceptual toolbox of network science [31]. This is the
approach that we follow here, where we comparatively analyze two different online social platforms, Twitter
and Gab, from the point of view of the robustness with respect to different types of ‘attacks’, namely of
targeted removals of some of their users from the respective networks. This kind of analysis may be seen as
an experiment in understanding the effectiveness of alternative strategies to counter the spreading of socially
dysfunctional content in online social platforms, thereby providing us with some first insights that may be of
special importance in designing the governance of current and future platforms. The reason why we chose
Twitter and Gab for our study is that, primarily, they clearly reflect the two main options we want to test in
our analysis: Twitter is a systematically moderated platform, whereas Gab is essentially unmoderated [32, 33].
On the other hand, the two platforms are very similar in many other features, and this makes of them a good
basis for a comparison, as opposed to other online social platforms with substantially different features. In
addition to this, data on these platforms can be collected with relative ease, and this allows the construction of
scientifically sound databases more easily than it is the case with other platforms.
The implementation of the degree-based dismantling strategy, which turns out to be a very effective one,
shows that, surprisingly, the moderated or unmoderated nature of the networks does not induce clear robustness
patterns. To understand the way the different networks respond to this type of intervention we resort to higher-
order topological correlations: the degree assortativity and a novel concept, the inter-k-shell correlation, which
is designed to give an idea of how the different centrality hierarchies in the network are connected among them.
We complement our analysis by proposing dismantling strategies based on the sentiment of the users, aiming at
evaluating how robust are the networks under the removal of a certain type of users. We find that the networks
are indeed quite robust, hence global communicability is guaranteed, if one blindly removes the users based
only on their sentiment. For a faster network dismantling, we propose strategies that combine topological and
sentimental information.
2 Results
2.1 Main features of the datasets
To analyze the robustness of Twitter vs. Gab to targeted attacks, that is, the structural consequences of the
removal of certain users from the network according to specific criteria, we had to select a topic that would
provide the criterion to identify users in terms of their participation in the online debate, of the inflammatory
content of their posts, of their structural position in the online community, and so on. We chose to focus on
posts referring to the current president of the United States of the America, Donald Trump, and containing
the following keywords: ‘trump’, ‘potus’. The choice of Donald Trump as the reference topic is due to the high
salience and popularity of this public figure in online social media debates, which are typically characterized by
highly polarizing and inflammatory content, thus making of it an ideal test bed for our analysis [34].
Content on Gab on a time window of 3 months in 2018, gathering a total of almost 450k posts, has been
made publicly available from https://pushshift.io/. As Twitter is much more populated than Gab and
characterized by much higher volumes of online activity, here we collected content in a time window of two
months in 2018, gathering a total of almost 45M posts. More detailed information and technical specifications
may be found in the Methods section.
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To reconstruct the behavioral networks from the online social platforms, we represent users as nodes and
interactions between users as links of a social network. For both Twitter and Gab, we considered two different
types of networks, capturing different facets of social interactions. The first one is replies: whenever a user
replies to the message of another user, a link between the two respective nodes is established. The second one
is mentions: whenever a user mentions another user in one message, a link between the two respective nodes is
established. For the sake of simplicity, we consider the networks as un-directed — no information is encoded
about who is the sender and who is the receiver of the messages —, unweighted — no information about the
number of interactions —, and time-aggregated — no information about the timing of the interactions.
Replies and mentions correspond to two different aspects of social interaction [35]. In the case of replies,
users are engaged in an active conversation between them, which can also be unilateral if one user responds
but the other does not in turn. In the case of mentions, one user is pointing attention of other users toward
a third user, but the mentioning and mentioned users need not be engaged in a direct conversation between
themselves. Replies are therefore part of a dyadic interaction as in a typical conversation (where clearly one
user may establish several conversations at the same time if multiple other users reply to his/her posts), whereas
mentions are typically part of a multi-lateral conversation that may intrinsically involve several users at the
same time, and even be targeted to reach an indefinite number of users.
On this basis, it is possible to construct analogous networks for Twitter and Gab users replying to, or
mentioning, other users in messages that contain Donald Trump related hashtags. The purpose of our analysis
is to investigate to what extent such networks are resilient to different types of attacks consisting of the removal
of a number of users with specific characteristics, on the basis of the different nature and characteristics of the
two online social networks in terms of moderation.
2.2 Robustness and topological properties
We study the robustness of the reconstructed networks by means of percolation theory [36]. The basic procedure
is to delete nodes according to a given criterion and, as the process unfolds, compute several properties of the
damaged system. In the context of online social networks, node deletion can be identified, as already hinted,
with the banning or temporary inhibition of a specific user, see Figure 1. A good topological proxy to assess the
robustness of the network is the largest connected component (LCC), which is the largest connected sub-network
remaining after user removal. When the normalized size of the LCC, S, is close to 0, the network is completely
disintegrated in many small clusters, and therefore there is no possibility to observe propagation of information
at a global scale. On the contrary, when S is close to 1, the removal of nodes barely affects the overall topology,
and information can potentially flow between almost every pair of actors. The passage from S 6= 0 to S = 0 is
called the percolation phase transition [37], and the exact value of the fraction of removed nodes for which the
size of the LCC becomes null is called the percolation point [38]. Roughly speaking, a network is considered
robust when it can handle a large amount of node removals without being disintegrated.
The most basic procedure to study network robustness is the random removal of nodes, which is equivalent
to the classic percolation process with degree heterogeneity [39]. Random attacks are known to be a poor
strategy to break a network, and especially when the degree distribution is broad [40, 41], which is a hallmark
of social networks [42]. This is because random node selection will pick with high probability low-degree nodes,
which do not play any significant role in keeping the network connected. A more effective strategy to destroy
a network consists in selecting nodes by degree, and remove those with the highest degree first. In this case,
the percolation point is significantly reduced [40, 43]. This response —weak to targeted attack but strong to
random failures— has been dubbed the robust-yet-fragile effect [44].
As an alternative to random attacks, here we perform degree-based attacks in our reconstructed networks
(Figures 1B and 1C), thus targeting structurally prominent users rather than randomly picked ones. To imple-
ment such attacks, we use an adaptive scheme: after each removal, we recalculate the degrees and recursively
choose the node with the highest degree to be deleted next. For all networks we find, as expected, a relatively
low percolation point, i.e., low robustness, a result that agrees with the idea that actors in social networks are
heterogeneously connected among each other. Another quantity that is heterogeneously distributed is the size
of the connected components at the percolation point. Their sizes are shown as bubble plots in Figures 1B and
1C, where the radius of each bubble is proportional to the logarithm of the number of actors in the components.
The cluster size probability density function is shown in Figure SM.1. These plots indicate that at the precise
moment the communication in our social networks cannot be held global anymore, it is very likely to find large
clusters with sizes that are very far away from the mean cluster size. Indeed, the distribution turns out to be
power-law p(s) ∝ s−α, with exponent α smaller than 3, a signature of infinite variance. This property only holds
at the percolation point, whereas away from it the finiteness of the variance is recovered due to an exponential
cutoff in the component size distribution.
We observe that the presence or absence of content control in the online social network does not induce a
clear robustness pattern. Indeed, in the network of replies the percolation point for Gab is larger than the one
for Twitter, whereas in the network of mentions the result is reversed. This leads us to conclude that content
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Figure 1: (A): Sketch showing the mapping between the online dynamics and the reconstructed behavioral
networks. Attacks are identified with the removal of agents and might split the network in smaller components.
In our case, two sub-networks appear once the actor B is attacked: {A,D,E} and {C}. The overall robustness
of a system is related to its capacity of maintaining a component as large as possible when suffering attacks.
(B) and (C): Curves of the largest connected component under degree-based attacks in the network of replies
and the network of mentions, respectively. “Moderated” corresponds to Twitter and “unmoderated” to Gab.
The above bubble plots show the connected components remaining at the percolation point. The size of the
bubbles is related to the logarithm of the component size.
policies cannot be directly correlated to robustness assessments in online social networks. To better understand
the response to degree-based attacks, we need to shed light on the topological properties of the networks. The
first thing to note is that since for uncorrelated networks, i.e., those networks where the degree of an actor is
independent of her neighbor’s degree, the percolation point is known to only depend on the first and second
moment of the degree distribution [45], and the degree distribution for all networks we considered is very similar
(Figure 2A), the reason for the variability in the robustness must therefore be hidden in topological correlations.
A topological correlation that is known to affect the percolation point is the mixing assortativity [46], known as
homophily in the social sciences [47], which reflects the tendency of actors to interact with peers with similar
characteristics. At the topological level we have the degree assortativity, which is positive when nodes are
mainly connected to other nodes of similar degree, and is negative when the opposite is found. A broadly used
measure to capture the level of homophily is the assortativity coefficient [42]
r =
〈qq′〉l − 〈q〉l〈q′〉l
〈q2〉l − 〈q〉2l
, (1)
where 〈·〉l denotes average over all links, and q and q′ are the excess degrees of the nodes at the end of a link,
that is, the number of edges attached to a node other than the one we reached out to. r is nothing else than
the Pearson correlation coefficient of the degrees at either end of an edge, and is normalized within the interval
[−1, 1]. The assortativity coefficient is appealing because it encodes the correlations into a single number, which
is usually employed to infer the robustness of the network. The percolation point of a network with positive
(negative) assortativity is higher (lower) than the percolation point of a network with r = 0, assuming the same
underlying degree distribution in all cases [48]. The larger the assortativity coefficient (in absolute value), the
greater the separation with respect to the percolation point of r = 0. In our case, we find that for the network
of replies rgab = −0.16 < rtwitter = −0.05 and for the network of mentions rgab = −0.26 < rtwitter = −0.04 [49].
The values of the assortativity coefficient agree well with the robustness patterns in the networks of mentions,
but not with those in the network of replies. Hence, the information brought by r is not sufficient to successfully
explain the response of our system to degree-based attacks.
The implicit assumption behind the assortativity coefficient is that the degree correlation —the mean degree
of the neighbors of all degree-k nodes 〈knn(k)〉 =
∑
k′ k
′P (k′|k), where P (k′|k) is the conditional probability
that following a link of a k-degree node we arrive at a degree-k′ node— has a linear dependence on the degree,
with slope r. If 〈knn(k)〉 ∼ rk does not apply, the value (and even the sign) of r can be misleading, as well as
the correct interpretation of the location of the percolation point as a function of r. We show in Figures 2B
and 2C that the linear assumption does not hold, although in all cases we observe a monotonically decreasing
tendency, concluding that all networks are dis-assortative. One could argue that in the network of replies,
Twitter’s 〈knn(k)〉 decays faster than in Gab, thus ensuring a higher robustness to the latter. This very same
argument, though, fails when applied to the network of mentions.
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Figure 2: (A): Degree distribution for the different networks and a curve scaling as k−2.2 to guide the eye.
Degree correlations for the networks of replies (B) and for the networks of mentions (C). The solid curve is
computed by averaging the data within k-bins, and the dashed horizontal line corresponds to 〈k2〉/〈k〉, which
is the value that 〈knn〉 would take if correlations are washed out.
At this point we must consider higher-order topological correlations to have a satisfactory explanation of
why the mention networks do not respond as expected from the assortative profiles. To this purpose, we use
the k-shell decomposition [50], which conveys information about the hierarchical structure of networks. The
concept of k-shell is intimately related to the one of k-core [51, 52], which is the sub-network that survives after
removing all nodes with degree less than or equal to k from the original network, see Figure 3A. The k-shell is
the subset of nodes that belong to the k-core but not to the (k + 1)-core. A network representation in k-shells
offers a qualitative way to assess the connectivity and clustering inside k-shells, and the degree-shell correlation,
i.e., how hubs are central with respect to their k-coreness, see [53] for further details. The most important
information for our discussion is the fact that hubs, indicated by larger markers in the first rows of Figures 3B
and 3C, are mainly located in the largest k-shell for both Twitter networks, and in the replies of Gab. For Gab
mentions, on the contrary, there is a larger density of hubs across k-shells (first row of Figure 3B). The presence
of hubs in different shells denotes a low degree-coreness correlation; put otherwise, there is an important number
of highly connected nodes at the periphery of the network.
In order to quantitatively support the qualitative observation of the degree-coreness correlation, we propose
here to inspect the connections among k-shells. Let K be the maximum k-shell index. We can compute a
symmetric matrix of dimension K × K, whose elements (i, j) are the number of links between nodes of k-
shells indexes i and j. By plotting this matrix as a heat map different patterns can emerge, and they can
be interpreted as an indicator of the tendency of nodes to communicate with their peers of same level of k-
coreness, hence giving a global idea of how centralized is the communication in the network that cannot be
captured by the assortativity or degree correlations. See Figure 3A for further details, where we distinguish
among possible behaviors. Thus, we call centralized networks those networks in which most of the nodes in
low and intermediate k-shells are connected only to those nodes in the largest k-shell. Likewise, a decentralized
network is characterized by nodes of all k-shells connected among them with a similar density of links. We plot
in the last row of Figures 3B and 3C such heat maps. In both Twitter networks and in Gab replies we find
that almost all inter-k-shell interactions occur between the nodes in the largest k-shell and the others, i.e., they
are centralized. Surprisingly, the heat map of Gab mentions is much more homogeneously populated, indicating
that each k-shell has a significant portion of links to distribute, and that this distribution covers all the other
shells with no particular preference, i.e., the network is decentralized. In light of this inter-k-shell connectivity,
we can explain why the Twitter mention network is more robust than the Gab one. Since in the former all
large-degree nodes are very interconnected among them in the largest k-core, deleting them leads to a slow
disintegration of the network. In the latter case, the hubs are not so well compacted in the largest k-core, but
decentralized across different levels in the topological hierarchy, therefore deleting them by degree leads to an
easier network disintegration.
2.3 Sentiment-based attacks
So far we have analyzed the robustness of the Twitter vs. Gab networks to attacks that are based on the degrees
of users in the online network, that is, on targeting the most relationally prominent individuals. Attacks of this
kind test the topological properties of the network, and they are known to effectively dismantle the underlying
graph, but are at the same time totally blind to any users metadata. However, there can be situations, and
this is especially the case in the context of social networks, in which we would like to assess the response of
the system to the removal of certain type of users, e.g., fake news generators or hate spreaders. In this section
we discuss the effects of carrying out attacks based on the sentiment of the users, as obtained from the body
of the messages they write. We will consider only the network of replies in this case, because it has a much
higher number of active users with well-defined sentiment than the network of mentions. We characterized the
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Figure 3: (A): Sketches showing the k-core structure of a toy network and heat maps with a decentralized and
centralized network organization. The patterns exemplified in the heat maps A1 to A4 represent scenarios in
which the connectivity is involving predominantly a single k-shell. In A1 most connections are between nodes
of the central core (K = 4) and other central shells (as in assortative networks). In A2 most connections are
between the central core and nodes of external shells (as in dis-assortative networks). In A3 and A4 most
connections involve the most external shell (K = 1). This can also happen in an assortative way (A3), where
most communication will be between isolated couples of nodes of the external shells, or a dis-assortative way
(A4) where most communication is between a large external shell of leaves and the central shells (core-periphery
structure). The patterns of heat maps A5 and A6 describe instead networks where connections are distributed
between multiple shells in such a way that nodes in a k-shell are mostly connected to the same shell or to
shells below and above in the hierarchy. They can be obtained by overlapping single shell effects similar to
that of A1. In A5, connections are homogeneously distributed across shells, while in A6 connections are more
abundant in the central shells. In (B) and (C), k-shell decomposition and associated heat map for Twitter and
Gab, respectively. The distribution of nodes and their degrees across the different k-shells can be appreciated
by representing the different nodes in concentric circles (plotted above using LaNet-vi [50]). In the heat maps
we focus instead on the connectivity. In the light of the pattern exemplified above, we observe how the Twitter
reply and mention and the Gab reply networks can be seen as an overlap of A1 and A2 (with the A3 patterns
also playing a minor role in Twitter). The Gab mention network differs notably, and can be seen as an overlap
of the A2, A4 and A6 patterns: more communication is thus seen in the intermediate shells (A6) and between
marginal and central nodes (A4).
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Figure 4: Size of the largest connected component for the sentiment-based attacks in Twitter (A) and in Gab
(B). Each curve corresponds to the sentiment targeted for the removal. (C): Correlation between the sentiment
score and the degree of the nodes. The corresponding sentiment is written in the vertical axes. For the sake of
clarity, in Twitter networks we only plot a random 20% selection of all users.
amount of user’s text emotional content by a text-based analysis that distinguish three different components of
emotions, namely valence, arousal and dominance. We leave for the Supplementary Material the same analysis
for other three sentiment classifiers, where we reach identical conclusions to the ones presented below.
We perform the attacks by sorting nodes with decreasing intensity of the (numerical indicators of the)
different sentiments, and deleting the nodes following that order. In other words, at each round we delete
those users whose posts are the most emotionally charged (i.e., potentially most inflammatory) among those
still present in the network. We display the results of this process in Figures 4A and 4B. The most striking
result is that the percolation point is quite large, that is, one needs to remove practically all actors to break
apart the main component. Moreover, the percolation curves are similar to the typical response of a scale-free
network subject to random attacks, therefore indicating that either most of the extreme sentiments are located
in the low-degree regime, or that, at least, there is no significant correlation between the position of a user in a
network and the sentiment of the messages s/he writes.
Figure 4C sheds some light on the interplay between topology and sentiment. We can observe that, in-
deed, the most extreme sentiments values are located in the area of low degrees, which explains why the
sentiment-based attacks do not result in a very effective dismantling of the networks. Another particularity of
the sentiment-topology correlation is that the sentiment score becomes independent of the degree as k grows.
This is somewhat surprising, as one would expect non-trivial effects of the network structure on the sentiment
distribution. A plausible explanation of this result is that, as users become more active (larger degree), their
sentiment values, which are computed over all their written posts, average out resulting in a neutral sentiment
value.
An important consequence of this particular sentiment-topology correlation is that when it comes to protect
a network against certain type of content or type of users, blind removal proves to be a very efficient strategy
at a global level, in the sense that guarantees the potential exchange of information between all the remaining
pair of nodes. However, if the goal is to use sentiment information to achieve an efficiently network dismantling,
the implemented strategy must be combined with some topological information. One of the options is to sort
from highest to lowest the users according to a sentiment, but ignoring those below a certain degree threshold
kthr. That is, for example, remove users that generate hateful content as far as these users are active above
a certain threshold. With this simple modification, we see a significant decrease in the percolation point, i.e.,
the networks become less robust. The percolation curves for different values of kthr are shown in Figure 5. We
indeed see that passing from kthr = 0 to 1 already reduces the percolation point by about 45% in Gab and 40%
in Twitter, while passing from kthr = 0 to 2 leads to a reduction of about 61% in Gab and 56% Twitter.
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Figure 5: Size of the largest connected component for sentiment-based attack applied to nodes with degree
k > kthr in Twitter (A) and Gab (B). Line color corresponds to the attacked sentiment and the line style to
the low-degree threshold. Note that the S curves do not arrive at 0 because the gap reflects the nodes that are
not slated for deletion (either k ≤ kthr or they do not have an assigned sentiment).
3 Discussion
In scholarly and policy debates, great emphasis is placed on the issue of whether online social platforms should
be moderated or not [54]. Clearly, one of the main issues is to what extent moderation can be effective in leading
users to a more responsible use of the platform and to keep anti-social attitudes and contents under control [55].
One would expect that the presence of moderation or the lack thereof would make a big difference in terms
of the effectiveness of network dismantling interventions against the production and diffusion of dysfunctional
content promoting hate, violence, discrimination, and the like. However, a somewhat surprising result of our
analysis is that moderation does not seem to be a crucial factor to consider in the assessment of the effectiveness
of network dismantling, and therefore in evaluating which type of online social platform may be more easily
governed in this regard.
Looking into the results in more detail gives some extra insight. We have considered two different kinds
of networks, one based upon replies to posts by another user, and the other upon mentions of another user
in the body of text of someone’s post. In terms of anti-social content, the replies network is typically bound
to capture the dysfunctional evolution of online conversations (e.g., flames), whereas the mentions network is
more geared toward capturing invitations to group-based attacks (e.g. shaming). What we find is that, when
considering dismantling strategies based upon topological network features (i.e. users’ degrees), Gab proves to
be more robust in the replies network whereas Twitter is more robust in the mentions network. In unmoderated
networks, group-based attacks to users may rapidly escalate and become particularly virulent, and therefore
removing those haters who are most connected may effectively power down the circulation of information across
the network. In the case of a moderated platform, such escalation is partly already filtered out and so the attack
could turn out relatively less effective. This seems to be a good reason why Gab proves to be less robust than
Twitter in this context. On the other hand, when moderation is present in the network, group-based attacks
are more easily detected and filtered out, whereas dysfunctional conversations are more elusive and can more
easily survive the filter. When the filter is relatively less effective, network breakdown may make the difference.
In this case, removing the most connected users may dismantle an information flow that would be difficult to
block otherwise, and this is a possible reason why Twitter is relatively more affected by attacks to the replies
network.
Considering higher-order topological correlations, and therefore the hierarchical structure of networks by
means of k-shell decomposition, it turns out that the network hubs tend to be located in hierarchically central
parts of the network in the case of both Twitter networks and in the replies network of Gab, In the mentions
network of Gab we find instead a different structure where network hubs are more distributed and therefore
also marginal areas of the network maintain high levels of connectivity. Even if the global network architecture
may be dismantled, therefore, in the Gab mentions network the marginal parts may remain highly active and
cohesive nevertheless. In this case, therefore, the dismantling of global information flow cannot be regarded as a
fully satisfactory outcome in terms of network attack. In particular, a substantial risk remains that once the core
users have been successfully removed, previously marginal pockets that survive the attack may subsequently
gain more centrality in the remaining network and launch a new cycle of dysfunctional content creation and
propagation.
One could consider, however, a more intuitive way of designing and carrying out the attacks —namely,
directly targeting the users who create and spread the most inflammatory content. We have therefore analyzed,
for the replies network, an alternative strategy of sentiment-based attacks where the emotional charge of posted
content may be evaluated with respect to the scale of a specific target sentiment. The users who rank higher
in sentiment activation may therefore be recursively targeted and removed. However, this alternative strategy
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seems to be less effective, so that actual network dismantling calls for a high number of cycles of removal that
may practically amount to break down the whole network. The reason for this is intuitive: users who post
the most inflammatory content need not be socially prominent, and one might even argue that it is the most
marginal users who have the strongest incentive to post the most inflammatory content to gain more credit and
visibility in their online community [56]. As a consequence, a lot of energy is spent in removing users who have
very little effect on the network structure. The corollary of this result is that communication properties remain
almost untouched while cutting off a large amount of extreme emotional content.
However, combining the results from the analysis of the two strategies, we obtain a viable proposal for an
effective strategy of attack, namely combining topological and content information to define the criterion for
removal. If removal is carried out by targeting the more inflammatory users above a minimal degree threshold,
network dismantling proves to be significantly more effective. A smart combination of topological and content
criteria may therefore provide the basis for a new generation of attack strategies that can inform new approaches
to the governance of online platforms.
The role of moderation as a key component of governance remains ambiguous. However, our analysis allow
us to provisionally conclude that sentiment based censorship can be a suitable strategy to implement when the
objective is not to dismantle the communication network but to maintain the potential exchange of information
across the network while limiting the sharing of dysfunctional content. This appears to be possible because
extreme users social relevance is very weak in both platforms analyzed.
4 Methods
4.1 Data
We collected messages from both Twitter and Gab, selecting a set of keywords that refer to Donald Trump,
including ‘trump’ or ‘potus’. In the Gab database there are 447,965 messages, spanning a time window of 3
months, from Wednesday 1 August 2018 0:53:10 (GMT) to Monday 29 October 2018 3:03:58 (GMT). In the
Twitter database (accessed via the public API) we have 44,934,988 messages, spanning a time window of 2
months, from Sunday 26 August 2018 17:28:20 (GMT) to Saturday 27 October 2018 18:24:37 (GMT).
4.2 Sentiment analysis
We used emotional classification of texts to estimate sentiment spectra of single user’s corpus of messages. To
this aim, we performed text-based sentiment analysis by employing widespread algorithms to classify user’s text
corpus. Note that for each message, pre-processing steps were carried out to normalize various aspects of the
text before analyzing it (all text have been lower-cased, “broken” unicode fixed).
The text classification employed in the main text is divided in three dimensions, namely valence, arousal
and dominance [57], where the first is related to the pleasantness, the second to the intensity of emotion and
the latter is related to the degree of control exerted by a specific word. To make our analysis more general
and flexible, we only include lemmas (that is the base form of the word) in our database. Emotional ratings
of about 14000 English lemmas, with scale ranges from 1 (happy, excited , controlled) to 9 (unhappy, annoyed,
dominant), are contained in our database.
To further support our results, we have repeated the analysis — reported in the Supplemental Material —
with other 3 algorithms, that we detail next. One uses the Big Five personality traits model [58, 59], that
describes personality as a vector of five values corresponding to bipolar traits, namely Extroversion, Neuroti-
cism, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Openness. Personality detection from text was performed using a
database containing ratings of about 1000 lemmas or short sentences.
Another method aiming at measure the perceived individual well-being was also performed [60, 61]. The over-
all satisfaction present in the text is estimated through multiple components of well-being, that were measured
as separate, independent dimensions: Positive Emotions, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning and Accomplish-
ment (PERMA). For each dimension, there is a further specification of its positive and negative acceptation,
resulting in 10 different sentiment dimensions.
Finally, the last method we have used to characterize corpus sentiment is based on the eight emotions
postulated by Plutchik [62], namely Acceptance, Anger, Anticipation, Disgust, Joy, Fear, Sadness and Surprise,
that are considered to be the basic and prototypical emotions [63].
References
[1] Michael Szell, Renaud Lambiotte, and Stefan Thurner. Multirelational organization of large-scale social
networks in an online world. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(31):13636–13641, 2010.
9
[2] Adam DI Kramer, Jamie E Guillory, and Jeffrey T Hancock. Experimental evidence of massive-scale emo-
tional contagion through social networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(24):8788–
8790, 2014.
[3] Javier Borge-Holthoefer, Nicola Perra, Bruno Gonc¸alves, Sandra Gonza´lez-Bailo´n, Alex Arenas, Yamir
Moreno, and Alessandro Vespignani. The dynamics of information-driven coordination phenomena: A
transfer entropy analysis. Science advances, 2(4):e1501158, 2016.
[4] Philipp Lorenz-Spreen, Bjarke Mørch Mønsted, Philipp Ho¨vel, and Sune Lehmann. Accelerating dynamics
of collective attention. Nature communications, 10(1):1–9, 2019.
[5] Pier Sacco, Guido Ferilli, and Giorgio Tavano Blessi. From culture 1.0 to culture 3.0: Three socio-technical
regimes of social and economic value creation through culture, and their impact on european cohesion
policies. Sustainability, 10(11):3923, 2018.
[6] Barry Wellman, Anabel Quan Haase, James Witte, and Keith Hampton. Does the internet increase, de-
crease, or supplement social capital? social networks, participation, and community commitment. American
behavioral scientist, 45(3):436–455, 2001.
[7] Samantha Bradshaw and Philip Howard. Troops, trolls and troublemakers: A global inventory of organized
social media manipulation. 2017.
[8] Massimo Stella, Emilio Ferrara, and Manlio De Domenico. Bots increase exposure to negative and inflam-
matory content in online social systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(49):12435–
12440, 2018.
[9] Massimo Stella, Marco Cristoforetti, and Manlio De Domenico. Influence of augmented humans in online
interactions during voting events. PloS one, 14(5), 2019.
[10] Imran Awan. Islamophobia and twitter: A typology of online hate against muslims on social media. Policy
& Internet, 6(2):133–150, 2014.
[11] Anat Ben-David and Ariadna Matamoros-Ferna´ndez. Hate speech and covert discrimination on social
media: Monitoring the facebook pages of extreme-right political parties in spain. International Journal of
Communication, 10:1167–1193, 2016.
[12] Karsten Mu¨ller and Carlo Schwarz. Fanning the flames of hate: Social media and hate crime. Available at
SSRN 3082972, 2019.
[13] Larissa Hjorth and Sam Hinton. Understanding social media. SAGE Publications Limited, 2019.
[14] Anne Linke and Ansgar Zerfass. Social media governance: regulatory frameworks for successful online
communications. Journal of Communication Management, 17(3):270–286, 2013.
[15] Laura DeNardis and Andrea M Hackl. Internet governance by social media platforms. Telecommunications
Policy, 39(9):761–770, 2015.
[16] Anne Kaun and Carina Guyard. Divergent views: Social media experts and young citizens on politics 2.0.
International Journal of Electronic Governance, 4(1-2):104–120, 2011.
[17] Robin IM Dunbar. Social cognition on the internet: testing constraints on social network size. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1599):2192–2201, 2012.
[18] Dar Meshi, Diana I Tamir, and Hauke R Heekeren. The emerging neuroscience of social media. Trends in
cognitive sciences, 19(12):771–782, 2015.
[19] Eun Lee, Fariba Karimi, Hang-Hyun Jo, Markus Strohmaier, and Claudia Wagner. Homophily explains
perception biases in social networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.08601, 2017.
[20] Daniel Geschke, Jan Lorenz, and Peter Holtz. The triple-filter bubble: Using agent-based modelling to test
a meta-theoretical framework for the emergence of filter bubbles and echo chambers. British Journal of
Social Psychology, 58(1):129–149, 2019.
[21] Fabian Baumann, Philipp Lorenz-Spreen, Igor M Sokolov, and Michele Starnini. Modeling echo chambers
and polarization dynamics in social networks. Physical Review Letters, 124(4):048301, 2020.
[22] William J Brady, Julian A Wills, John T Jost, Joshua A Tucker, and Jay J Van Bavel. Emotion shapes
the diffusion of moralized content in social networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
114(28):7313–7318, 2017.
10
[23] Chris J Vargo, Lei Guo, and Michelle A Amazeen. The agenda-setting power of fake news: A big data
analysis of the online media landscape from 2014 to 2016. New media & society, 20(5):2028–2049, 2018.
[24] Majed Alrubaian, Muhammad Al-Qurishi, Mabrook Al-Rakhami, Mohammad Mehedi Hassan, and Atif
Alamri. Reputation-based credibility analysis of twitter social network users. Concurrency and Computa-
tion: Practice and Experience, 29(7):e3873, 2017.
[25] David MJ Lazer, Matthew A Baum, Yochai Benkler, Adam J Berinsky, Kelly M Greenhill, Filippo Menczer,
Miriam J Metzger, Brendan Nyhan, Gordon Pennycook, David Rothschild, et al. The science of fake news.
Science, 359(6380):1094–1096, 2018.
[26] Philip N Howard, Gillian Bolsover, Bence Kollanyi, Samantha Bradshaw, and Lisa-Maria Neudert. Junk
news and bots during the us election: What were michigan voters sharing over twitter. CompProp, OII,
Data Memo, 2017.
[27] NF Johnson, R Leahy, N Johnson Restrepo, N Velasquez, M Zheng, P Manrique, P Devkota, and Stefan
Wuchty. Hidden resilience and adaptive dynamics of the global online hate ecology. Nature, 573(7773):261–
265, 2019.
[28] Kyle Langvardt. Regulating online content moderation. Geo. LJ, 106:1353, 2017.
[29] Cliff Lampe, Paul Zube, Jusil Lee, Chul Hyun Park, and Erik Johnston. Crowdsourcing civility: A natural
experiment examining the effects of distributed moderation in online forums. Government Information
Quarterly, 31(2):317–326, 2014.
[30] Jukka-Pekka Onnela and Felix Reed-Tsochas. Spontaneous emergence of social influence in online systems.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(43):18375–18380, 2010.
[31] Hai-Bo Hu, Ke Wang, Ling Xu, and Xiao-Fan Wang. Analysis of online social networks based on complex
network theory. Complex Systems and Complexity Science, 2:1214, 2008.
[32] Savvas Zannettou, Barry Bradlyn, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Haewoon Kwak, Michael Sirivianos, Gianluca
Stringini, and Jeremy Blackburn. What is gab: A bastion of free speech or an alt-right echo chamber.
In Companion Proceedings of the The Web Conference 2018, pages 1007–1014. International World Wide
Web Conferences Steering Committee, 2018.
[33] Ivan Kalmar, Christopher Stevens, and Nicholas Worby. Twitter, gab, and racism: the case of the soros
myth. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Social Media and Society, pages 330–334.
ACM, 2018.
[34] Sean M Eddington. The communicative constitution of hate organizations online: A semantic network
analysis of “make america great again”. Social Media+ Society, 4(3):2056305118790763, 2018.
[35] Christine Greenhow and Benjamin Gleason. Twitteracy: Tweeting as a new literacy practice. In The
Educational Forum, volume 76, pages 464–478. Taylor & Francis, 2012.
[36] Dietrich Stauffer and Ammon Aharony. Introduction to percolation theory. Taylor & Francis, 3 edition,
1991.
[37] Sergey N Dorogovtsev, Alexander V Goltsev, and Jose´ FF Mendes. Critical phenomena in complex net-
works. Reviews of Modern Physics, 80(4):1275, 2008.
[38] The theory of percolation assumes that we deal with infinite systems, hence the percolation phase transition
and the percolation point are well-defined only in this regime. In a finite system, though, the size of
the largest connected component is exactly 0 only when all nodes are removed. Although the drop from
S ∼ O(1) to S ' 0 tends to be relatively abrupt and localized in finite systems, there is no general criterion
to identify the percolation point directly from the size of the LCC. An alternative and accurate method,
which is the one we employ, is to identify the percolation point with the fraction of removed nodes for
which the size of the second largest connected component is maximum.
[39] Duncan S Callaway, Mark Newman, Steven H Strogatz, and Duncan J Watts. Network robustness and
fragility: Percolation on random graphs. Physical Review Letters, 85(25):5468, 2000.
[40] Re´ka Albert, Hawoong Jeong, and Albert-La´szlo´ Baraba´si. Error and attack tolerance of complex networks.
nature, 406(6794):378, 2000.
[41] Reuven Cohen, Keren Erez, Daniel Ben-Avraham, and Shlomo Havlin. Resilience of the internet to random
breakdowns. Physical Review Letters, 85(21):4626, 2000.
11
[42] Mark Newman. Networks. Oxford University Press, 2018.
[43] Reuven Cohen, Keren Erez, Daniel Ben-Avraham, and Shlomo Havlin. Breakdown of the internet under
intentional attack. Physical Review Letters, 86(16):3682, 2001.
[44] John C Doyle, David L Alderson, Lun Li, Steven Low, Matthew Roughan, Stanislav Shalunov, Reiko
Tanaka, and Walter Willinger. The “robust yet fragile” nature of the internet. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 102(41):14497–14502, 2005.
[45] Michael Molloy and Bruce Reed. A critical point for random graphs with a given degree sequence. Random
structures & algorithms, 6(2-3):161–180, 1995.
[46] Mark Newman. Assortative mixing in networks. Physical Review Letters, 89(20):208701, 2002.
[47] Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M Cook. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks.
Annual Review of Sociology, 27(1):415–444, 2001.
[48] Mark Newman. Mixing patterns in networks. Physical Review E, 67(2):026126, 2003.
[49] Equation 1 is not a useful expression when it comes to compute the assortativity coefficient directly
from degree sequences. We have used, instead, a much more convenient expression, namely, r =∑
ij
(Aij−kikj/2m)kikj∑
ij
(kiδij−kikj/2m)kikj .
[50] J. I. Alvarez-Hamelin, Luca Dallasta, Alain Barrat, and Alessandro Vespignani. Large scale networks
fingerprinting and visualization using the k-core decomposition. In Y. Weiss, B. Scho¨lkopf, and J. C. Platt,
editors, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 18, pages 41–50. MIT Press, 2006.
[51] Stephen B Seidman. Internal cohesion of ls sets in graphs. Social Networks, 5(2):97–107, 1983.
[52] Stephen B Seidman. Network structure and minimum degree. Social Networks, 5(3):269–287, 1983.
[53] Ignacio Alvarez-Hamelin, Luca Dall’Asta, Alain Barrat, and Alessandro Vespignani. Lanet-vi in a nutshell,
2006.
[54] Tarleton Gillespie. Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, content moderation, and the hidden decisions
that shape social media. Yale University Press, 2018.
[55] Sarah Myers West. Censored, suspended, shadowbanned: User interpretations of content moderation on
social media platforms. New Media & Society, 20(11):4366–4383, 2018.
[56] Willem De Koster and Dick Houtman. ‘stormfront is like a second home to me’ on virtual community
formation by right-wing extremists. Information, Communication & Society, 11(8):1155–1176, 2008.
[57] Amy Beth Warriner, Victor Kuperman, and Marc Brysbaert. Norms of valence, arousal, and dominance
for 13,915 english lemmas. Behavior research methods, 45(4):1191–1207, 2013.
[58] H Andrew Schwartz, Johannes C Eichstaedt, Margaret L Kern, Lukasz Dziurzynski, Stephanie M Ramones,
Megha Agrawal, Achal Shah, Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, Martin EP Seligman, et al. Personality,
gender, and age in the language of social media: The open-vocabulary approach. PloS one, 8(9):e73791,
2013.
[59] Basant Agarwal. Personality detection from text: A review. International Journal of Computer System,
1(1), 2014.
[60] H. Andrew Schwartz, Maarten Sap, Margaret L. Kern, Johannes C. Eichstaedt, Adam Kapelner, Megha
Agrawal, Eduardo Blanco, Lukasz Dziurzynski, Gregory Park, David Stillwell, Michal Kosinski, Martin E.P.
Seligman, and Lyle H. Ungar. Predicting individual well-being through the language of social media. Pacific
Symposium on Biocomputing, pages 516–527, 2016.
[61] Marie J. C. Forgeard, Eranda Jayawickreme, Margaret L. Kern, and Martin E. P. Seligman. Doing the
Right Thing: Measuring Well-Being for Public Policy. International Journal of Wellbeing, 1(1):79–106,
2011.
[62] Robert Plutchik. A general psycoevolutionary theory of emotion. In Theories of Emotion, pages 3–33.
Elsevier, 1980.
[63] Saif M. Mohammad and Peter D. Turney. Crowdsourcing a word-emotion association lexicon. Computa-
tional Intelligence, 29(3):436–465, 2013.
12
100 101 102 103 104
Component size
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
P
D
F
∼ k−3
Mentions Gab
Replies Gab
Mentions Twitter
Replies Twitter
Figure SM.1: Component size distributions at the percolation points of Figures 1B and 1C. The dashed line is
not a fit, but is drawn to show that the distributions decay with an exponent smaller than 3, i.e., the second
moment of the distribution diverges.
Supplemental Material
In Figure SM.1 we plot the cluster size distribution at percolation point for the 4 networks analyzed in the main
text. Figure SM.1 is related to the bubble plots of Figures 1B and 1C in the main text.
In Figures SM.2–SM.4 we display the same analyses as the ones conducted in Figure 4 in the main text. That
is, we show the correlation between the degree and the sentiment, the latter being computed using the Big Five
algorithm (Fig. SM.2), the Sentiments algorithm (Fig. SM.3) and the Wellbeing algorithm (Fig. SM.4). Each
plot is accompanied by the robustness profiles, implemented with sentiment-based attacks. All these curves are
qualitatively the same, independent of the algorithm employed to detect the sentiment.
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Figure SM.2: Size of the largest connected component for the sentiment-based attacks in Twitter and in Gab.
Each curve corresponds to the sentiment targeted for the removal. On the right, the correlation between the
degree of the nodes and the sentiment score computed by using the Big Five algorithm. The corresponding
sentiment is written in the vertical axes. For the sake of clarity, in Twitter networks we only plot a random
20% selection of all users.
Figure SM.3: Size of the largest connected component for the sentiment-based attacks in Twitter and in Gab.
Each curve corresponds to the sentiment targeted for the removal. On the right, the correlation between the
degree of the nodes and the sentiment score computed by using the Sentiments algorithm. The corresponding
sentiment is written in the vertical axes. For the sake of clarity, in Twitter networks we only plot a random
20% selection of all users.
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Figure SM.4: Size of the largest connected component for the sentiment-based attacks in Twitter and in Gab.
Each curve corresponds to the sentiment targeted for the removal. On the right, the correlation between the
degree of the nodes and the sentiment score computed by using the Wellbeing algorithm. The corresponding
sentiment is written in the vertical axes. For the sake of clarity, in Twitter networks we only plot a random
20% selection of all users.
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